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Brief of Appellants
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are the owners of real property located
within the corporate limits of North Salt Lake, a municipal corporation, and also within the boundaries of the
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South Davis Water Improvement District, an improvement district created under the procedures set forth in
Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Chapter
29, I.jaws of Utah, 1953). They brought this action for
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of their continued inclusion within the South Davis Water Improvement District, and to enjoin the District from taking
actions that would subject plaintiffs' property to liability
for the obligations of the Water Improvement District
(R. 1-5). Davis County, its Commissioners, and the members of the Board of Trustees of the South Davis Water
Improvement District were joined as parties defendant.
Davis County and the Board of Trustees of the South
Davis Water Improvement District moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs' Complaint on the ground that it did not state
a claim upon which relief might be granted (R. 10, 12).
The District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and
for Davis County, Honorable Charles G. Cowley presiding, granted the motions to dismiss (R. 26), and on
December 28, 1955, entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 28). It is from that order that this
appeal is taken (R. 29).

On X oYember 22, 1955, counsel for the defendant
submitted to the court a:ffidaYits from some of the parties
plnintiff that they ''haYe been more fully advised of the
facts and it is no\\T their desire that they be 'Yithdrawn
as party plaintiffs.'~ The affidaYits "Tere :filed on behalf
of Clifford J. 1\ladsen, ElYa E. J[adsen, Eugene Johnson,
Frt\ya Johnson, J ark Johnson, Esther Johnson, .L\..lbert
L. Anderson, Janis B. Anderson, Perry L. Een, Lola R.
Een, Erma Smith, and Le,Yis Smith (R. 14-19). ThereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

upon counsel for the remaining plaintiffs moved the
court to drop the named parties as plaintiffs in this action
(R. 21). Although this motion has not been heard nor
decided, the named plaintiffs have not joined in this
appeal and are not considered appellants herein. Inasmuch as the invalidity of a state statute is being asserted
in this action, notice of the action was given to the Attorney General of the State of Utah pursuant to 78-33-11
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 24). The State of Utah
was not joined as a party.
The case having been disposed of below on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim against the moving
defendants, the facts alleged in the Complaint are taken
to be true for the purposes of this appeal. The Complaint
shows that the County Commissioners of Davis County
on about May 7, 1954, created the South Davis Water
Improvement District. At that time the property of
plaintiffs' was not located within the boundaries of any
incorporated city. On or about April1, 1955, the property
belonging to plaintiffs was annexed by North Salt Lake
pursuant to the provisions of 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated
1953 (R. 2). North Salt Lake did not join in the creation
of the South Davis Water Improvement District, as it
might have done under the statute, but continued to
operate its own system for the distribution of water to
the inhabitants of the town. The town will continue to
operate its own water works system, and in connection
with the operation of that system will assert a right to
make the plaintiffs contribute to the maintenance of the
system by way of taxes levied by the municipal corporation (R. 2).
3
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Under the provisions of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, water improvement districts have
the power to cause taxes to be levied on real property
located within the boundaries of the district. The Board
of Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement District intends to exercise this power of taxation and to
cause taxes to be levied against the property of the plaintiffs. The taxes so levied will be used to support the
water distribution system to be constructed, operated,
and maintained by the District (R. 2).
Plaintiffs in this action requested the Board of
Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement District
and the Board of Commissioners of Davis County to take
action to exclude the plaintiffs' property from the Improvement District. Both of these defendants, however,
refused to take any such action and claimed that under
the statutes of the state-particularly Title 17, Chapter
6, Utah Code Annotated 1953-neither of them, nor both
of them together, had any power to exclude property
once it was included within the district (R. 3). Upon
this refusal, and the indication of the improvement district that it was going ahead 'Yith the sale of bonds and
the incurrence of obligations affecting plaintiffs' property, this action was brought.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The complaint states a claim upon '-rhich relief
can be granted under the proYisions of the Utah Declaratory tTudgments Act.
4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are the o"\vners of real property located
within the corporate limits of North Salt Lake, a municipal corporation, and also within the boundaries of the
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South Davis Water Improvement District, an improvement district created under the procedures set forth in
Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Chapter
29, Laws of Utah, 1953). They brought this action for
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of their continued inclusion within the South Davis Water Improvement District, and to enjoin the District from taking
actions that would subject plaintiffs' property to liability
for the obligations of the Water Improvement District
(R. 1-5). Davis County, its Commissioners, and the members of the Board of Trustees of the South Davis Water
Improvement District were joined as parties defendant.
Davis County and the Board of Trustees of the South
Davis Water Improvement District moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs' Complaint on the ground that it did not state
a claim upon which relief might be granted (R. 10, 12).
The District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and
for Davis County, Honorable Charles G. Cowley presiding, granted the motions to dismiss (R. 26), and on
December 28, 1955, entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 28). It is from that order that this
appeal is taken ( R. 29).
On November 22, 1955, counsel for the defendant
submitted to the court affidavits from some of the parties
plaintiff that they "have been more fully advised of the
facts and it is no\v their desire that they be \Yithdrawn
as party plaintiffs.'' The affidaYits \Yere filed on behalf
of Clifford J. l\1:adsen, Elva E. l\fadsen, Eugene Johnson,
Freya Johnson, Jack Johnson, Esther Johnson, Albert
L. Anderson, Janis B. Anderson, Perry L. Een, Lola R..
Een, Erma Smith, and Lewis Smith (R. 14-19). There-

2
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upon counsel for the remaining plaintiffs moved the
court to drop the named parties as plaintiffs in this action
(R. 21). Although this motion has not been heard nor
decided, the named plaintiffs have not joined in this
appeal and are not considered appellants herein. Inasmuch as the invalidity of a state statute is being asserted
in this action, notice of the action was given to the Attorney General of the State of Utah pursuant to 78-33-11
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 24). The State of Utah
"\Vas not joined as a party.
The case having been disposed of below on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim against the moving
defendants, the facts alleged in the Complaint are taken
to be true for the purposes of this appeal. The Complaint
shows that the County Commissioners of Davis County
on about l\fay 7, 1954, created the South Davis Water
Improvement District. At that time the property of
plaintiffs' was not located within the boundaries of any
incorporated city. On or about April1, 1955, the property
belonging to plaintiffs was annexed by North Salt Lake
pursuant to the provisions of 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated
1953 (R. 2). North Salt Lake did not join in the creation
of the South Davis Water Improvement District, as it
might have done under the statute, but continued to
operate its own system for the distribution of water to
the inhabitants of the town. The town will continue to
operate its own water works system, and in connection
with the operation of that system will assert a right to
make the plaintiffs contribute to the maintenance of the
system by way of taxes levied by the municipal corporation (R. 2).
3
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Under the provisions of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, water improvement districts have
the power to cause taxes to be levied on real property
located within the boundaries of the district. The Board
of Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement District intends to exercise this power of taxation and to
cause taxes to be levied against the property of the plaintiffs. The taxes so levied will be used to support the
water distribution system to be constructed, operated,
and maintained by the District (R. 2).
Plaintiffs in this action requested the Board of
Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement District
and the Board of Commissioners of Davis County to take
action to exclude the plaintiffs' propert3T from the Improvement District. Both of these defendants, however,
refused to take any such action and claimed that under
the statutes of the state-particularly Title 17, Chapter
6, Utah Code Annotated 1953-neither of them, nor both
of them together, had any power to exclude property
once it was included ''Tithin the district (R. 3). Upon
this refusal, and the indication of the improvement district that it was going ahead "\Yith the sale of bonds and
the incurrence of obligations affecting plaintiffs' property, this action was brought.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The complaint states a claim upon "\Yhich relief
can be granted under the provisions of the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act.
4
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2. The complaint states facts upon which plaintiffs
would be permitted to prove that the continued inclusion
of their property within the improvement district violates
rights guaranteed them by the ''equal protection'' cia use
of the United States Constitution and the "uniform
operation" clause of the Utah Constitution.
3. The complaint states facts under which plaintiffs
\vould be permitted to prove that the continued inclusion
of their property within the improvement district violates
the right guaranteed to them by Article XI, Section 6,
of the Utah Constitution, to have North Salt Lake preserve, maintain and operate a waterworks system.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANT'ED UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UTAH DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT.

The record does not show, and the court did not
indicate, the basis upon which it ruled that the plaintiffs'
complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. However, because of the arguments presented below, and in view of the general rules of pleading
in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appellants
concluded that the court's objection to the complaint was
based on substantive grounds.
Paragraph 8 of the complaint states that there is a
controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendants
concerning the construction of statutes relating to the

5
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powers of boards of trustees of improvement districts
and boards of county commissioners, particularly with
referenee to exclusion of property from improvement
districts. Paragraph 9 of the complaint, construed in the
light of other paragraphs in the complaint, shows a controversy between plaintiffs and defendants over the
validity of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated
1953, insofar as it affects the property of the plaintiffs.
The prayer in the complaint asks for a declaration of
rights, specifically with reference to the validity of the
creation of the Improvement District under Title 17,
Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the powers of
the Board of County Commissioners and the Trustees
of the District to exclude plaintiffs' property from the
South Davis Water Improvement District. Paragraphs
1, 5 and 6 of the complaint show that the plaintiffs have
valuable property and other rights which will be affected
by the declaration.
It is provided in Section 78-33-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, that
'' .L\._ny person in teres ted under a deed, will or
w·ritten eontract, or "-hose rights, status or other
legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract or franchise, may ha\e determined any question of construction or \alidity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance,
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."

'rhat deelnratory judg-ments are Yery frequently used
to deter1nine questions as to the construction and Yalidity
of statutes eannot be denied. ''The contest as to Yalidity
6
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often arises between governmental authorities who need
the clarifying therapy against a challenging or recalcitrant official or board whose cooperation is required.''
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed). p. 774. The
declaratory judgment action is frequently used to determine the scope of powers and duties of public officers
and commissions. Id. at 795. Surely the complaint in
this case sets forth a "justiciable controversy" and such
an interest in the plaintiffs that a declaration as to their
rights would be valuable.
Notwithstanding the generally accepted VIew that
the declaratory judgment is an alternative remedy and
is available even though a different type of action may
be brought (Gray v. De fa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251
[1937]), it is recognized that there are situations in
which because of a particular statutory remedy it may
be held that a declaratory judgment should not be
granted. For example, where a statute provides a
''special form of remedy for a specific type of case'' it
may be proper to deny declaratory relief as is done under
the Pennsylvania act cited in Borchard, Declaratory
Judgments (2d Ed.), p. 346.
The reason for such a rule is apparent. Where the
legislature provides that certain matters will be heard
only in particular ways or before particula·r tribunals,
the legislative intent would be defeated if litigants were
permitted to have the matters heard in a different manner. With reference to the creation of improvement
districts, it is true that there is in Utah a statute which
provides a ·''special form of remedy for a specific type
7
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of case.'' It is not true, however, that the remedy is
provided for this specific type of case. The statutory
section in question is 17-6-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which provides in pertinent part as follows:
''Any property owner who shall have filed a
written protest, as hereinbefore provided, and
\vhose property has been included, notwithstanding such protest, may within thirty (30) days after
the adoption of the resolution establishing such
district, apply to the district court of the judicial
district in which such county is located for a writ
of review of the actions of the board of county
commissioners in so establishing such district, but
only upon the ground that his property will not
be benefited by the proposed improvements or
upon the ground that the proceedings in establishing the district have not been in compliance with
the provisions of this statute. A failure to apply
for such a writ of review within said time shall
foreclose all owners of property within said district as so established from the right to further
object thereto.''
Object whereto~ In Yiew of the narrow issues which
can be presented to the district court under this statutory '' \vri t of review'', Yiz., ''benefit'' and ''statutory
procedure,'' can it be Yalidly argued that it was the
legislative intention to prevent property O"\\rners from
raising any questions as to the Yalidity of the statute,
corresponding rights of ri ties and districts, and the
application of the statute to particular persons when
there has been a drastic change in circumstances subsequent to the date of the hearing and the time in which
the writ of re\~ie'v could haYe been taken f The complaint
in the instant case does not parellel the \vrit of review.
8
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This is a ne\v case. It has new issues and a much broader
scope than anything that could have been presented to a
district court under the statutory procedure. It is conceded that the provisions of 17-6-3 prevent property
owners within an improvement district from bringing a
declaratory judgment action, subsequent to the period
of limitations provided in that section, to determine
whether the county commission correctly decided the
question of benefit, or to determine whether the county
commission and the improvement district followed the
statutory procedure in establishing such a district. However, that is all it prevents; and litigants who have a
justiciable controversy relating to the validity of the act
or its application to new situations, may properly bring
an action for a declaratory judgment. (For a general
discussion of the relation of declaratory judgment acts
to statutory proceedings see Borchard, Declaratory
Judgments [2d Ed.], pp. 342 et seq.)
See also Deer Park Civic Association v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N.E. 2d 823 (1952), wherein
the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment to test the
validity of a zoning ordinance. It was shown that prior
to adoption of the ordinance the owners of the property
in question had received a building permit for construction contrary to that which plaintiff thought permissible
under the ordinance. After issuance of the permit, the
plaintiff did not appeal to the zoning board of appeals,
as required by current procedures. Thereafter a new
zoning ordinance was passed which permitted the construction of buildings in the manner provided by the
9
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building permit. The court held that the plaintiff was
not barred from declaratory relief, saying, "When the
amendment became effective a question of law arose,
determination of which is beyond the power of the Board
of Appeals. We think the plaintiff did not lose the right
to bring this suit because they did not appeal to the
Board.''
Adoption by this court of the view that the provisions of 17-6-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 prevent the
granting of declaratory relief in actions of this type
would not of itself cure the error committed by the
district court in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. The
court should have entered a declaratory judgment even
if it was convinced that the plaintiff was not entitled to
the specific declaration it asked for. The general rule
relating to the sufficiency of a complaint in an action for
a declaratory judgment is stated in Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, p. 275, as follows:
I

''A declaratory complaint will not be dismissed
because the court disagrees with the construction
of the contract involved, contended for by the
plaintiff. A complaint in an action for declaratory
relief which recites in detail the dispute between
the parties and prays for a declaration of rights
and other legal relations of the parties, states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
against a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
the complaint.''

In 1l/ aguz~re et al. r. Hibernia Sa r£ngs cf Loan .A. ssociat?:on, 23 (~~ll. 2d 719, 146 1"). 2d 673 (1944), the Supreme
Court of (~alifornia \Yas required to rule directly on
whether a complaint might be dismissed if it showed on

10
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its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to a favorable
declaration. The court, after reviewing the decisions on
the point and adopting the rule as stated by Anderson,
supra, held that the complaint states a cause of action
whether or not the pleader states facts sufficient to show
he is entitled to a favorable declaration.
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court
of Oregon in Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove et al., 170
Ore. 256, 130 P. 2d 1013 (1943). This was an action for
a declaratory judgment brought by the plaintiffs as
members of the State Highway Commission in which it
was alleged that there was a controversy between the
City and the State Highvvay Commission as to the Commission's authority to maintain barricades in certain
areas. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. Reversing, the court said:

''It is entirely clear that the complaint alleges
a justiciable controversy both a.s to the city and
the property owners, and the contention of want
of jurisdiction is without merit. * * * This being
so, it is also clear that the complaint states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the
declaratory judgment law. 'It is rare that a demurrer is an appropriate pleading for the defendant to file to a petition for a declaratory judgment,' City of Cherryvale v. Wilson, 153 Kan. 505,
510, 112 P. 2d 111, 115. The test of sufficiency of
such a complaint is not whether it shows that the
plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights in
accordance with his theory, but whether he is
entitled to a declaration of rights at all. Even
though the plaintiff is on the wrong side of the
controversy, if he states the existence of a controversy which should be settled by the court under
11
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the declaratory judgment law, he has stated a
cause of suit.''
In considering the circumstances under which a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
this court has held that if under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of his claim as pleaded in
the complaint, the plaintiff might be entitled to relief,
a motion to dismiss should not be granted. Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, ______ U. ______ , 243 P. 2d 441
( 1952). This holding conforms with the generally accepted rule under federal practice. 2 Moore's Federal
Practice, para. 12.08. Although the court in Liquor Co.n-

trol Cimmission v. Athas was not considering a complaint
based on the Declaratory Judgments Act, the decision is
applicable to all civil actions. The holding there, when
read with the authority cited above concerning the sufficiency of complaints for declaratory judgments, indicates
that the complaint in this case should not have been dismissed if, under any state of facts provable under it,
the plaintiffs could show a justiciable controversy between them and the defendants concerning the validity
or construction of the statutes relating to the creation
of improvement districts. The complaint does show a
justiciable controversy, and the case should be reversed
and remanded to the district court for a declaratory
judgment as to the rights and legal relations of the
parties.
12
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II.
THE COMPLAINT STATES FACTS UNDER WHICH
PLAINTIFFS WO·ULD BE PE.Rl\flT'TED T'O PROVE THAT
THE CONTINUED INCLUSIO·N OF THEIR P'RO·PERTY
WITHIN THE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT VIOLATES
RIGHTS GUARANTEED THEM BY THE "EQUAL PR.O~
TECTION" CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE "UNIFORM OPERATION" CLAUSE
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Complaint allege
that the property owned by plaintiffs is located within
both the boundaries of the South Davis Improvement
District and the boundaries of North Salt Lake, and that
both the Improvement District and the Municipal Corporation claim the right to supply the plaintiffs with
water. The above paragraphs also allege that both of
the political subdivisions claim the right to tax plaintiffs
for the support of a water distribution system. Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges that plaintiffs' location
within the boundaries of the two political subdivisions,
and their exposure to the taxing power of the two political
subdivisions, violates Article I, Section 24 of the
Utah Constitution and Amendment XIV, Section 1, of
the United States Constitution. The paragraph further
alleges that by virtue of the operation of provisions of
the statute relating to the selection of trustees, these
constitutional provisions are violated again.
The statute providing for the creation of improvement districts for water, sewers or sewage systems was
drafted without reference to county or municipal boundaries. It was intended to permit areas with similar
water or sewage problems to create improvement dis-
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tricts. In 17-6-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 it is provided
that the area of any district created under the statute
''may include all or part of any county or counties, including all or any part of any incorporated municipalities, other incorporated areas, and unincorporated areas
as the needs of the inhabitants of the proposed districts
may appear." The statute recognizes that there are
different problems as to representation of the governing body of the improvement district when municipalities
are included within the district's boundaries. If an incorporated municipality is contained entirely with an
improvement district that also includes other territory,
the governing body of the municipality is entitled to name
a resident of the municipality as a member of the board
of trustees of the district (17-6-3.1). If the boundaries
of the district and the boundaries of the municipality
coincide, the board of trustees is comprised of the governing body of the municipality. The act also provides
for the election of members of the board of trustees at
the time that the bond election is held. Section 17-6-3.1
goes on to provide :
''In voting on the question of the issuance of
the proposed bond, none but such qualified voters
as shall haYe paid a. property tax in the district
in the year next preceding the election shall be
permitted to vote, but in voting on the election of
trustees all qualified voters ·in the district outside
the corporate lhnits of any municipality or incorporated area shall be permitted to vote." (Emphasis added.)
These sections show that persons living in municipalities, all of which are included "Tithin an improvement
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district are represented on the board by appointees of
their municipal officers, and that persons living outside
of the municipalities, only part of which are located
within the boundaries of improvement districts, are
represented by no one. The municipal officers are not
permitted to appoint a trustee, and the property owners
are not permitted to vote for a trustee. That is the
situation of the plaintiffs in this action.
Quaere, whether there is any reasonable basis for
providing for representation of the board of trustees for
all persons whose property is within an improvement
district except those persons whose property also lies
within a municipality, part of which is located within the
improvement district~ Were a statistician to examine
the Utah cases on "unreasonable classification" from the
standpoint of a quantitative analysis only, he would
probably conclude that the classifications established by
Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are
reasonable, have a basis for differentiation, and are not
arbitrary, since it is true that the Utah cases have
predominantly upheld legislation attacked as denying
equal protection or not having uniform operation.
If course, we as lawyers, rather than statisticians,
know that the quantum theory of decision making is not
foolproof. The factual situations presented to the court
relating to the reasonableness of legislative classifications
are so disparate that singly they are inconclusive. It is
signficant, however, that even those cases upholding
legislative classifications are careful to point out that
the classification must be reasonable and that there must
15
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be a basis for differentiation between the classes established by the legislation. The cases also held that in
determining whether a classification is reasonable, the
court must consider the objects and purposes of the act.
State v. JJfa,son, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920 (1938). A
reading of the Utah cases, together with the general
rule as to classifications, can be of some help in determining the types of situations in which classifications
are upheld or overturned. Many of the cases upholding
the legislative classifications have been concerned with
classi:fica tions of businesses and persons engaged in
business. State v. Mason, supra, involved the classification of businesses for licensing purposes. State v. J. B.
and R. E. Walker,. Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P. 2d 766 (1941),
involved the classification of businesses under an act
requiring the payment of wages in a certain manner.
Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939 (1943),
upheld a classification of businesses for purposes of application of the Sunday closing law. Other cases in which
the classification adopted by the legislature has been upheld as against attack under the ''uniform operation''
and ''equal protection'' clauses are State v. Packer Corporatio1t, 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 (1931), involving
the prohibition of certain advertising on billboards but
not in newspapers and magazines; nrallberg v. Utah
Public Welfare Co1nmission, 115 Utah 242, 203 P. 2d 935
(1949), differentiating between a husband and wife
living together and a husband and wife living apart for
purposes of a welfare lien; Slater t\ Salt Lake City, 115
Utah 476, 206 P. 2d 153 (1949), involYing classification
under a law.. prohibiting the distribution of literature on
16
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the streets of a municipal corporation; Davis v. Ogden
City et al., 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 616 (1950), involving
a distinction between employed and self-employed lawyers for tax purposes; Tygesen v. ~Magna Water Company, 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127 (1950), involving the
classification of newspapers for purposes of publishing
notices under the 1949 act relating to improvement districts; Han.sen v. Public Employees Retirement System
Board of Administration et al., ______ Utah ______ , 246 P. 2d
591 ( 1952), involving a classification of employees based
on the number of years of service under a retirement
act; and Abrahamsen v. Board of Review of Industrial
Commission, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P. 2d 213 (1955), involving a classification of types of workers and contractors under the employment security act of Utah.
There have been a number of cases, however, 1n
which the courts have been unable to find a reasonable
relation between the classifications established by the
legislature and the objects and purposes of the legislation. Among these are Board of Education v. Hunter, 48
Utah 373, 159 Pac. 1019 (1916), wherein a classification
for tax rate purposes based upon the assessed valuations
of cities of the first and second class was held invalid ;
Lyte v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 90 Utah 369,
61 P. 2d 1259 (1936), in which a law permitting a different method of filing charges under the Liquor Control
Act than under general criminal law was held to include
an unreasonable classification; and State v. Packard, _____ _
Utah ______ , 250 P. 2d 561 (1952), invalidating an "industrial peace" statute which applied different rules to
17
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strikes called by ''nationally recognized unions'' than
those called by ''other unions.''
Probably the most similar Utah case is Toronto v.
Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 222 P. 2d 594 (1950), involving
a provision in the Utah Statute of Limitations which
barred actions accruing after a certain date but not
those which accrued before that date. The case might
be described as one in which there was an ''unconscious
classification,'' for it is probable that the distinction
between the two classes of cases would not have been
made if the legislature had been more careful in its
draftsmanship. Notwithstanding this, the act required
a construction that the classes were there, and since in
view of the objects and purposes of the act there was no
reason for making the distinction between the earlier
and the later transactions, the legislative classification
was held invalid under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution and under Amendment XIV, Section 1, of
the United States Constitution. It is possible that in the
present statute the legislature, if it had thought about
it, would have provided for a vote by property owners
whose property lies within an improvement district and
also within a municipal corporation, part of "\Yhich is
within the improvement district. But the act is clear
that such persons are not entitled to vote and the courts
nre not permitted to add "\Yords or phrases where it is
not clear what the "rords or phrases should be. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 4924: Cra,vford, Statutory Construction, § 201.
The act is written in such a manner that there is a
18'
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classification, for purposes of elections of the board of
trustees. This classification has no reasonable relation
to the purposes of the act. Certainly there is a reasonable relation between the purposes of the act and the
classification of the areas which participate in the formation of the district into municipalities and county
areas. There is also a reasonable relation between the
purposes of the act and the method of representation of
these classes of individuals on the boards of trustees.
But there is no reasonable relationship between the
purposes of the act and the deprivation of the right of
representation to the small class of people in plaintiffs'
situation.
If the act by its terms creates one classification which
is unreasonable, by its silence it creates another. This
classification is between persons living in municipalities
\vhich join in an improvement district at the time it is
formed, and persons living in an area annexed by a
municipality after having been included in the improvement district. In the first case it is reasonable to suppose that the municipality conducts its affairs with
reference to the operations planned by the improvement
district and that to the extent that the improvement district provides \Vater or sewage services, the operations
of the city will be that much lessened. In the instant
case, because of the gap in the statute the plaintiffs are
exposed to the actions of two political subdivisions. They
are caught, so to speak, in a tug-of-war between North
Salt Lake and the South Davis Water Improvement District. Both want to give water services. Both want to
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tax for them. Both 'vant to charge for them. And the
plaintiffs are the ones vvho have to pay.
We are not unmindful of the cases which hold that
the burden is upon the person attacking the legislative
classification to show that the classification is unreasonable. But the burden cannot be met without an opportunity to meet it. Surely, the requirement relating to
the burden of the plaintiff refers to something more than
a requirement that the person attacking the legislative
classification be the most convincing in an argument on
the subject. There are a number of facts, receivable in
evidence, which would have a bearing upon the reasonableness of the legislative classification. In this action
the appellants would like to have an opportunity to
present facts and to meet the burden placed upon them.
By the action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim the opportunity was
never there. We submit that the court erred in dismissing
the complaint and that it should have heard the case on
its merits and made a determination as to whether the
act is unconstitutional as depriving the plaintiffs and
appellants of their rights under the "uniform operation"
clause of the Utah Constitution a.nd the "equal protection" clause of the United States Constitution.

20
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III.
THE COMPLAINT STATES FACTS UNDER WHICH
PLAINTIFFS WO'ULD BE PERMITTED TO PROVE THAT
THE CONTINUED INCLUSION O·F THEIR PROPERTY
WITHIN T'HE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT VIOLATES
THE RIGHT GUARANTEED TO THEM BY ARTIC:LE XI,
SECTION 6, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, TO HAVE
NORTH SALT LAKE PRESERVE, MAINTAIN AND
OPERATE A WATERW~)RKS SYSTEM.

Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges that the operation of a water distribution system within the corporate
limits of North Salt Lake violates Article XI, Section 6,
of the Utah Constitution, in that it derogates from the
duty of the municipality to preserve, maintain and
operate its waterworks for supplying water to its inhabitants at reasonable cost.
Article XI, Section 6 provides :
''No municipal corporation, shall directly or
indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any
waterworks, water rights, or sources of water
supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled
by it; but all such waterworks, water rights and
sources of water supply now owned or hereafter
to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall
be preserved, maintained and operated by it for
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges : Provided, that nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent any such municipal
corporation from exchanging water-rights, or
sources of water supply, for other water-rights
or sources of water supply of equal value, and
to be devoted in like manner to the public supply
of its inhabitants."
Although the rule frequently has been announced
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that the legislature has almost plenary powers to create
and control municipal corporations, cases recognizing
this rule have also recognized that the power of the
legislature with reference to municipal corporations is
often limited by specific constitutional provision. See
Wadsworth et al. v. Sa.n.taquin City et a.Z., 83 Utah 321,
28 P. 2d 161 (1933).
No cases have been found interpreting the extent
to which Article XI, Section 6, Utah Constitution, limits
legislative power to affect water systems of municipalities; but it has been said that the provision was meant
to be a prohibition on the legislature as well as on the
municipality. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water &
Electric Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 Pac. 672, 678 (1902).
It will be conceded, we think, that under this section
the legislature would be without power to enact legislation either directing or empowering a municipal corporation to dispose of its waterworks system, or to dispose of
water rights \Vithout receiving in exchange other water
rights of equal value. It seems reasonable to suppose,
also, that the legislature is without power to enact legislation prohibiting a municipal corporation, or municipal
corporations generally, from preserving, maintaining
and operating waterworks; or from supplying water to
inhabitants at reasonable cost.
The statute in question in this case does not purport
to restrict the right and duty of municipal corporations
to preserve, maintain and operate waterworks; nor does
it purport to empower the municipalities to alienate their
waterworks, rights or sources. The statute purports only
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to authorize the creation of improvement districts and
to permit the participation of municipalities in the districts when it is in the interest of the municipality to
participate. If that were all that the statute did, it would
be, under past decisions of this court, unobjectionable
(Tygesen. v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d
127 [1950], Freeman v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P.
2d 174 [1954] ). But in determining the validity of the
application of Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated
1953, to the town of North Salt Lake, consideration of
the situation of the municipality and the practical effects
of the legislation is mandatory, for it is not what this
statute purports to do but what it does that will have the
greatest bearing upon its constitutionality. It has been
held repeatedly that a legislature cannot do indirectly
what it is prohibited from doing directly.
Because of the contiguity of the South Davis Water
Improvement District and the town of North Salt Lake,
both of which will operate water systems, and the overlapping of their boundaries, it may be expected that
there will be competition between them with reference
to the right to supply water to property owners. It is
common knowledge that the ability of an operator to
carry on his operations economically may depend upon
the extent to which he is able to control charges for his
services; and that the ability to control charges is frequently lost in a competitive situation.
Depending upon the size of its water system, the
density of demand, and the prices chargeable, it may be
that the town of North Salt Lake, by virtue of the opera23
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tions of the South Davis Water Improvement District,
will not be able to ''preserve, maintain and operate'' its
waterworks for supplying its inhabitants with water at
reasonable charges. The extent to which the town has
grown, the amount of water available for growth, the
size of its water distribution system, and the geography
of the area-together with the methods of operation and
charges of the improvement district-all will have an
effect upon the ability of the town of North Salt Lake
to operate its water system.
It may be argued that this is conjecture, and that
there is no evidence in the record to show that the water
system of the town of North Salt Lake will be adversely
affected by the operation of the South Davis Water Improvement District. The argument would be true but
not valid. There is no evidence in the record relating
to the effects of the legislation because the court below
dismissed the complaint without having given the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence. The complaint
alleges that the town will continue to operate its system,
that both the town and the district will operate in the
area wherein lies plainiffs' property, and that the operation of the district will derogate from the town's constitutional duties.
That the provisions of Article XI, Section 6, were
adopted for the benefit of the inhabitants of municipal
corporations is apparent from a reading of the section
itself; and if not from that, then from the section's
history. The framers of the Utah Constitution regarded
the water systems of municipal corporations as being
24
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held "in trust" for the inhabitants of the municipal
corporations. 1 Proceedings, Constitutional Convention
of 1895, pp. 669 et seq. The "beneficiaries" have the
requisite standing to question the validity of the legislation.
In view of the reasonably foreseeable effects of the
establishment of water improvement districts in areas in
which they compete with the water systems of municipal
corporations, the pleadings raised questions of fact
having a bearing upon a determination of the validity
of the creation of this improvement district. For that
reason the court should not have dismissed the complaint
but should have heard the matter and decided it on the
merits.

CONCLUSION
The complaint in this action contained allegations
which, fairly construed, show a justiciable controversy
between the plaintiffs and the defendants. This being
so, it was error for the court to dismiss the complaint
as failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Moreover, the complaint raised questions of a
constitutional nature, resolution of which was dependent
upon consideration of facts surrounding the creation
and operation of the South Davis Water Improvement
District. Consequently, in view of the broad provisions
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to "notice
pleading" and the policy in favor of determinations of
the merits, the court erred in dismissing the complaint.
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It is submitted that the complaint does state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, that there are factual
issues to be determined, and that the action of the court
below should be reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
BRYCE E. ROE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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